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INTRODUCTION

Payday lending presents a problematic double-edged sword. On one hand,
arguably predatory lenders charge fees which, when aggregated, often result in
very high annual percentage rates (APRs). On the other hand, countless, often
unsophisticated consumers have few alternatives for short-term credit without
these lenders. The dynamics of this market create opportunities for exploitation
and abuse. When this practice is unregulated, lenders can structure transactions
that take advantage of the less sophisticated consumers. Needless to say, the
problem is complex, and efforts to address the issue have progressed in a variety
of ways. A minority of states has determined that the best solution is to
essentially ban the practice. Others, such as South Carolina, have attempted to
regulate the industry and strike a balance between the needs of consumers and
the potential for abuse. Unfortunately, no scheme is perfect, and state
governments and regulatory agencies must vigilantly continue to monitor
developments in the industry to ensure that consumers remain protected.
There is no clear solution or "right answer" to the problems inherent with
payday lending. However, the most practical option is to craft a system that
balances the two extremes (unregulated vs. abolished) by allowing the practice,
but strictly regulating it to combat abuse. A demand for payday loans exists, and
basic economics suggests that consumers would not demand a product that did
not result in some benefit to them. Moreover, there are often legitimate needs
623
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for this type of credit; thus, not every payday loan is necessarily predatory.
Completely outlawing the practice, therefore, would deprive consumers who
legitimately need these loans from a desired service. Conversely, payday lenders
should not be allowed free rein, where they can take advantage of
unsophisticated consumers who do not comprehend the full consequences of the
transactions.
The South Carolina General Assembly's recent enactments are a major step
toward a balanced approach. However, because the effectiveness of these
provisions remains uncertain, state entities as well as consumer watchdogs
should continue observing the industry to ensure that borrowers are protected
and that regulations are adequately enforced. In addition, the General Assembly
should consider promulgating an enabling act to allow a state agency, such as the
State Board of Financial Institutions, to issue regulations that could more easily
address problems in a timely manner. Finally, South Carolina should consider a
broader regulatory scheme that oversees all short-term loans (rather than solely
payday loans) so that lenders cannot take advantage of loopholes in the South
Carolina Code. By undertaking these strategies, South Carolina can secure a
safer and fairer payday lending market for its citizens.
Part II of this Note introduces the structure of a typical payday loan and
tracks the historical development of the practice. Part II also discusses
behavioral economic theory, providing context for why these loans exist and
describing some inherent problems in the structure of the payday lending market.
Part III analyzes the various regulatory approaches governments have undertaken
in relation to the industry, recognizing that neither an unregulated payday
lending market nor an outright ban is desirable. Part IV examines the history of
South Carolina's efforts to regulate the payday lending industry. Part V
discusses why South Carolina should not let the industry operate in a laissezfaire environment, pointing out the economic inefficiencies of the unregulated
practice and arguing for continued enforcement and oversight rather than a ban.
Finally, Part VI provides recommendations for how South Carolina can oversee
the payday lending industry in the future. Ultimately, a well-enforced regulatory
scheme can create a level playing field where both borrowers and lenders benefit
from the transaction.
11. THE BACKGROUND OF PAYDAY LENDING

A. What is a Payday Loan?
Betty Borrower is a typical American citizen living in the state of South
Carolina. She is a single mother of three and works at a local retail store. Betty
makes a modest hourly wage, and her earnings are usually enough to cover
general expenses as they arise. However, last month one of Betty's children
became ill with pneumonia and had to see a doctor twice. Because she does not
have health insurance, Betty must pay for these visits out of pocket. Betty rides
public transit to work and rents, rather than owns, her residence. Therefore, she

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/4

2

Williams: The Dimensions of the Shark Tank: The Appropriate Regulation of P

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SHARK TANK

2011]

625

is unable to utilize resources like a car title loan or a home equity line of credit.
In addition, Betty's poor credit history means that her credit card limit is set at a
ceiling of $200, and unfortunately she has no family members who are able to
help cover her costs. How is Betty going to pay for these unexpected expenses?
When a situation like this arises, a payday loan may become desirable.
Payday loans are easy to qualify for and a borrower can receive cash very
quickly. In a typical state, a lender may only need "a driver's license, pay stub,
bank statement, telephone bill, and checkbook" from the borrower to issue a
loan.' If Betty presents a payday lender with these items, she can receive cash
immediately, regardless of her credit history. 2 In a typical transaction, Betty
would state the amount of cash needed and then give the lender a postdated
check for that amount plus whatever fee the lender charges (either a flat dollar
amount or a percentage of the principal). 3 At the end of the loan's term,
typically around two weeks, the lender would cash the check and the transaction
would be complete. 4 In an ideal world, Betty would have enough resources to
cover repayment of the loan plus the fee. However, like many consumers, she
may be unable to repay the entire balance when it comes due.
Complications arise when a borrower cannot repay a payday loan because
many lenders structure each payday loan such that it must be paid off at the end
of the two-week period.5 This is described as a "balloon" payment, and Betty
must either make this payment or pay a renewal fee to extend the original loan
for another fixed term. The ability to amortize a payday loan throuh a series of
monthly payments is usually not an option under the loan structure. This all-ornothing requirement for repaying the loan is what sometimes gives rise to the
infamous "debt treadmill." Instead of offering amortization, the lender probably
would allow Betty to pay a renewal or "rollover" fee to continue the loan for
another payment period. 9 Betty might pay this fee simply for the convenience of
not having to pay off the loan at the first due date. However, she may extend the
loan because she is genuinely unable to repay the balance. Ultimately, Betty

1.

See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business of PredatoryLending?, 87 MINN.

L. REV. 1, 9 (2002).
2.
See id. (citing Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The FringeBanking System andIts Challenge to Current Thinking About the

Role of Usury Laws In Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 606 (2000); Daniel A. Edelman,
Payday Loans: Big Interest Rates and Little Regulation, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 174, 174
(1999)).
3. See id at 10 (citing Smith v. Check-N-Go of Illinois, Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir.
1999); Drysdale & Keest, supra note 2, at 600-01).
4.
See id. (citing Jean Ann Fox, What Does It Take to Be Loan Shark in 1998? A Report on
the Payday Loan Industry, in 1 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 987, 990 (1998)).
5.
See id. at 59.
6.
See Karen E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics
Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEx. L. REV. 611, 612 (2010).
7.
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 59.
8.
See id. at 57-64.
9.
See Francis, supra note 6, at 612.
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may only be able to afford a string of these renewals, thus perpetually "rolling
over" the loan and never reducing the principal owed. This situation can result
in outrageous APRs that often are the subject of critical headlines about the
industry.
The fine line between valuable service and predatory "loan sharking" is
intriguing because of the unique structure of the payday lending market. Like
Betty, many borrowers may not have other readily accessible means of shortterm financing. Therefore, the absence of a payday lending industry could leave
these sensible borrowers, who truly intend the transaction to be a "one time"
deal, without recourse. However, the tendency of payday lenders to prey on
borrowers' various misconceptions indicates that an unregulated market is not
desirable either.
B.

The History of Payday Lending

Attempts to limit and regulate lending practices are as old as the transactions
themselves.10 Indeed, prohibitions on usur 1 are present in the biblical books of
Exodus, 12 Leviticus, 13 and Deuteronomy. Unsurprisingly, despite prohibitions
on the practice, societies crafted complex lending systems.15 For example, one
historic transaction functioned much like a modem day mortgage, with a
landholder temporarily transferring a possessory interest in land in exchange for
a lump sum.
This mortgage-like transaction, along with other complex
schemes for avoiding usury prohibitions, persisted for many years until
restrictions ultimately began to ease.17 Instead of continuing an outright ban,
some authorities began allowin lenders to charge for their services and only
prohibited "excessive" interest.
Regardless, many usury restrictions were
simply ignored to begin with.19 To curtail this, some states opened their
courtroom doors, allowing private borrowers to seek recourse against these
fringe lenders, with some plaintiffs even managing to win judgments.

10. See Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended
Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 961, 969 n.121 (2008).

11. "Historically, [usury was] the lending of money with interest."

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1685 (9th ed. 2009).

12. See Exodous 22:25.
13. See Leviticus 25:37.
14. See Deuteronomy 23:19-20.
15. See Spector, supra note 10, at 969-70.
16. See id. at 970.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 972.
20. See, e.g., Capital Loan Co. v. Bell, 170 S.W. 570, 571 (Ark. 1914) (upholding a decree
finding that a certain lending arrangement was usurious); Tolman v. Union Cas. & Sur. Co., 90 Mo.
App. 274, 279 (Ct. App. 1901) ("[W]e are clear the present [loan] is tainted with usury and void by
force of the statutes."); Cotton v. Barnes, 167 S.W. 756, 757 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (affirming a
judgment that a loan was usurious).
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Despite growing challenges related to these fringe consumer loans, however,
payday lending was able to operate "under the radar" of regulators for some time
due to its relatively new status. 2 1 Ultimately, several consumer class action suits
filed in state and federal courts brought attention to the industry's problems, 22
and various groups began to petition state legislatures for increased regulation.23
Currently, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) serves as the model
legislation for state regulation of payday lenders. 24
C. Effect of Other Law on the Payday Lending Industry

Aside from the gradual increase in direct oversight of payday lending, a few
non-industry-specific provisions arose over the years. For example, unfair trade
practices statutes apply if evidence indicates that a lender made
misrepresentations to a borrower.25 In addition, both state and federal legislation
concerning debt collection practices apply if money is actually collected by the
lenders.26 Moreover, the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)27 mandates
disclosures regarding the cost of credit at the time of the transaction.28 Payday
lenders initially asserted that they were exempt from these TILA requirements,
but in recent years, the industry has recognized its obligation to comply with the
statute. 29 Another federal restriction limits the interest rate on loans made to
military families, and federal provisions, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act,31 prevent lenders from discriminating based on race, marital status, or

21. See Spector, supra note 10, at 975.
22.

See, e.g., Pinkett v. Moolah Loan Co., No. 99C2700, 1999 WL 1080596, at *10 (N.D.

Ill. Nov. 2, 1999) (certifying a class action suit against payday lenders and holding that a lender
must disclose that it holds a security interest in a post-dated check); Hahn v. McKenzie Check
Advance of Ill., LLC, 61 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (dismissing class action claims
against a defendant lender because the court found that the lender received a security interest in the
post-dated check); Ex parte Speedee Cash of Ala., Inc., 806 So. 2d 389, 390, 394 (Ala. 2001)
(lifting an order staying proceedings in a consumer class action against Alabama payday lenders
where the borrowers alleged that the money kept by the lender constituted interest).
23. See Spector, supra note 10, at 975.
24. See id.

25. See Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Pa. Dep't of
Banking v. NCAS of Del., LLC, 995 A.2d 422, 444 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing 73 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 201-2(4) (West 2008)).
26.

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.

§§

1692, 1692e, 1692f (2006) ("It is the purpose ...

to eliminate

abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged. . . ."); S.C. CODE

ANN. § 37-5-108(2) (2002) ("[I]f... a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage
in unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising from [a consumer credit transaction], the
court may grant an injunction.").
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (2006).
29. See id.; Spector, supra note 10, at 979.
30. See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2006).
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nationality.32 These peripheral state and federal limitations impose some
burdens on the industry, but are minimal compared to many state attempts at
regulation. 33
D. The Economic Impetus for Payday Lending

In an efficient and competitive market, with equally sophisticated and
informed buyers and sellers, economic theory dictates that the price of a payday
loan (or any good or service) should equal its marginal cost. However, evidence
suggests that the industry is not economically efficient, 34 and according to one
commentator, a significant reason for this inefficiency is the traditional structure
of these transactions. 3 5
The typical payday loan is crafted such that the immediate costs (the initial
fees) are relatively inexpensive, and the long-term, contingent costs are much
more severe.36 Lenders are generally able to anticipate more certain profits from
consumers who continue to renew their loans. 37 Steady fees from the reliable
borrowers subsidize newer customers, 38 who typically bring much more
uncertainty and risk.39 In other words, allowing consumers to become repeat
borrowers encourages loan growth while reducing risk. Without significant
regulation, lenders are able to create an extremely profitable environment. In
fact, it has been estimated that lenders receive over ninety percent of their profits
from consumers who have five or more rollovers per year. o Needless to say, an
unbridled market can be dangerous for consumers, but very lucrative for lenders.
Borrowers often fail to recognize the dangers inherent in payday loans
because many do not understand their structure and risk.4 1 Consumers believe
that their loans will be a "one time thing" 42 and that the fee charged is reasonable
for that purpose.43 Lenders build on this "it won't happen to me" perspective by
promoting the loans as lasting just until payday and by offering a small "finance
charge" rather than a large APR.44 As a result, borrowers are tempted by the
enticing "money now" nature of the transaction and are lulled into ignoring the

32. § 1691(a), (b).
33. See supraPart III.
34. See id.; Francis,supra note 6, at 631.
35. See id. at 631-33.
36. Id. at 632.
37. See id. (citing Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 44 (2008)).
38. See Francis,supra note 6, at 632.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 632 (citing Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 37, at 44).
41. Id. at 632-33.
42. See id.
at 629.
43. See id. at 630.
44. See id. at 632-33.
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significant problems that can arise when payday arrives and they cannot repay
the loan.
III. REGULATORY APPROACHES TO PAYDAY LENDING FROM ACROSS THE
NATION

States have addressed, both legislatively and judicially, the payday lending
industry and its perceived problems. Some states have determined that the
optimal solution is prohibition. 45 However, a majority of states allows the
industry to function under a system of regulations. 46 Most state oversight
schemes place a maximum on the interest rate (or fee) charged or total loan
amount and also require lenders to make certain disclosures to borrowers. 47
Some states, however, have taken greater measures to combat the industry's
perceived problems. Florida, for example, prohibits rollovers and maintains a
statewide database of outstanding payday loans as a means of enforcement. 48
Moreover, Florida guarantees borrowers a sixty-day grace period to repay the
loan (free from penalties) and requires credit counseling for individuals who
utilize the grace period.49 Similarly, other states, such as Hawaii and Colorado,
prevent lenders from seeking criminal charges against borrowers who present
bad checks.so
A. Banning the Payday Lending Industry
While most states have at least some degree of regulation over the industry,
others have placed more drastic restrictions on the practice, with some banning

or refusing to authorize payday lending.51 For example, North Carolina, which
was one of the first states to permit payday lending, allowed its statutes
authorizing the industry to sunset, and the practice ceased in 2006.52 In
Arkansas, the judiciary examined the state's payday lending authorization

45. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 26-319 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 1617-2 (2007).
46. For a full list of states, see Payday Lending State Statutes, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncs1.org/default.aspx?tabid=12473 (last updated Feb. 11, 2011).
47. See id.

48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(18), (19) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011).
49. See id. § 560.404(22)(a), (b)(3).
50. See COL. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-112, -120 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480F-6
(LexisNexis 2009).
51. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
52. See Spector, supra note 10, at 977 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-281 (expired
2001); Press Release, N.C. Att'y Gen. Roy Cooper, Payday Lending on the Way Out in NC (Mar. 1,
2006), available at http://www.nedoj.com/News-and-Alerts/News-Releases-and-Advisories/PressReleases/Payday-lending-on-the-way-out-in-NC.aspx; Demise of Payday Lending in North
Carolina, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/north-carolina/ncpayday/policy-legislation/archive/NCpayday2006.html (last visited May 11, 2011)).
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statutes53 and found them to be unconstitutional. 4 Moreover, Georgia actually
criminalizedyayday loans, 55 concluding that merely regulating the practice was
insufficient.
The rationale behind prohibition is fairly clear. Georgia's statutes, for
example, describe payday lending as having "an adverse effect upon military
personnel, the elders, the economically disadvantaged, and other citizens of the
State of Georgia." 5 Thus, to combat the problem, the Georgia legislature
decided "that substantial criminal and civil penalties" should be available against
lenders, and declared the practice "currently illegal."5 8 Presumably for Georgia,
the struggle to create a fairer payday lending industry was not a battle worth
fighting. One can surmise that similar motives were behind North Carolina's
decision not to renew the authorizing statutes that permitted the industry in that
state.
Arkansas presents a unique situation. The state legislature had enacted the
Check-Cashers Act,59 which allowed payday lending, subject to some
restrictions.60 Despite acknowledging that every legislative act "carrie[d] a
strong presumption of constitutionality," 61 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
ultimately found the Act unconstitutional. 62 The court reached this result
63
because of the usury prohibition found in the state's constitution.
While the decision to ban payday lending certainly addresses the industry's
issues with blunt force, it is not the ideal solution to a problem that can be
resolved without an outright ban.
Even the Arkansas Supreme Court
acknowledged that its decision would deprive citizens of a service not otherwise
available.6
The reservations of the Arkansas court are not unfounded. A
payday loan is a unique transaction, providing some borrowers with a necessary
form of credit. Consumers like Betty Borrower who have little savings and no
traditional sources of financing may lack other easily accessible means to pay for
an unexpected doctor's visit or automobile repair. Yet, problems arise when
borrowers enter into transactions unaware of the potential consequences or when
lenders are able to trap them in a cycle of debt. Fortunately, it is possible to
remedy these problems without banning the industry.

53.

See McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 289 S.W.3d 18, 23-28 (Ark.

2008).
54. Id. at 28.
55.
56.

See GA. CODE ANN.
See id. § 16-17-1.

§ 16-17-2

(2007).

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ARK. CODE ANN.
by McGhee, 289 S.W.3d 18.

§§

23-52-101 to -117 (2000 & Supp. 2007), declaredunconstitutional

60. See id.
61.
62.
63.
64.

McGhee, 289 S.W.3d at 23-24.
See id. at 28.
Id. at 24; see also ARK. CONST. art. XIX,
McGhee, 289 S.W.3d at 28.
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B. Mechanismsfor Regulating the Payday Lending Industry

State legislative and regulatory bodies have various mechanisms available to
help protect consumers and prevent unconscionable loan agreements. Perhaps
the most visible and effective option is limiting the interest rate or fee that a
lender can charge. One recent article examined the changed dynamics of payday
lending in New Mexico after its state legislature capped lender fees. 65 If Betty
Borrower lived in New Mexico before these new regulations (when rates were
unrestricted) and wished to take out a payday loan, the resulting annualized
interest rate could have approached 2500%.66 After the state passed the new
restrictions, which limited the maximum fee to $15.50 per every $100 loaned,67
the rate would have decreased around 404%.68
Despite the sizeable reduction, this rate still appears quite high for a person
of modest means like Betty. However, compared to the fee she would have
incurred for "bouncing" a check at her local bank, this rate could be a relative
bargain. At Bank of America an overdraft fee is normally $35, and the customer
must repay the fee and restore the account to a positive balance within five days
to avoid another fee.69 When analyzed from this perspective, this method of
short-term credit (if one could call it that) would result in an APR of 2555% for
an overdraft "loan" of $100 repaid on the fifth day.70 Consequently, when a
borrower like Betty truly needs cash, the total annualized interest of one payday
loan with a fee cap similar to that of New Mexico's could amount to less than
one-fourth the total annualized interest of a bounced check. The difference is
noticeable from a dollar cost perspective as well: Betty would pay $35 in fees for

65.

Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan

Practicesand Solutions, 52 ARIz. L. REv. 563, 578-80 (2010) (discussing the implementation of
changes to the New Mexico Small Loan Act of 1955, N.M. STAT ANN. § 58-15-1 to -39
(LexisNexis 2010)).
66.

See id. at 579-80.

67. § 58-15-33(B). The statute also allows lenders to charge a one-time $0.50 administrative
fee for each loan. § 58-15-33(C).
68. See Martin, supra note 65, at 579-80. For a breakdown of the formula used to calculate
the APR of a payday loan, see How to Calculate the Interest Rate on Payday Loans, ARKANSANS

AGAINST ABUSIVE PAYDAY LENDING, http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs2/aaapl-howtocal.
pdf (last visited May 11, 2011). Inserting these numbers (a $15.50 fee on a $100 loan that must be
repaid in fourteen days) into this formula results in an APR of 404.11%. Including the additional
$0.50 administrative fee yields an APR of 417.14%.
69. See Overdraft & NSF Fees, BANK OF AM., http://factsaboutfees.bankofamerica.com/
manage-banking-fees/overdraft-and-nsf-fees/ (last visited May 11, 2011) (stating that if an account

is overdrawn $10 or more, a $35 fee is assessed on the account).
70. The fixed nature of the overdraft fee would result in a lower APR on a higher overdraft
amount, with the rate falling to 851.67% for an overdraft of $300. However, because Bank of
America charges a fee each time the account is overdrawn, any benefits from a lower APR likely
would be more than offset by this crippling loss of flexibility. See Overdraft & NSF Fees, supra
note 69. For example, if Betty needed to pay four different bills of $100 each with overdrafts, she
would incur $140 ($35 for each transaction) in fees and face an APR of 2555% if she restored her
balance on the fifth day.
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an overdraft "loan" of $100 at Bank of America versus only $15.50 for a payday
loan of $100 under the New Mexico scheme. Comparing the two options, it
becomes evident that a statutory rate cap can greatly limit lender exploitation of
borrowers, while also providing borrowers with a more attractive form of shortterm financing than a bank overdraft.
A second method of creating a fairer payday lending market involves
monitoring outstanding loans to prevent indebted borrowers from repeatedly
renewing loans or obtaining multiple loans from multiple lenders. A database to
track outstanding payday loans is an important first step in the battle against the
debt cycle,71 and required compliance for lenders helps meet the goal of
preventing multiple renewals.72 Lenders often find loopholes, however, when
"renewal" and "rollover" are not adequately defined. In Ohio, for example,
lenders circumvented the state's rollover ban7 3 by issuin4 "renewals," which
involved charging a fee to extend the life of the initial loan. In Iowa, although
lenders may not make more than two outstanding loans to a borrower at one
time, they can still create a debt cycle by retiring one loan and merging it into a
second loan over and over. 76 Clearly, lenders are adept at exploiting any holes in
regulations.
Nevertheless, achieving a significant reduction in rollovers is
possible. Two scholars suggest that the key components are a database and a
mandatory cooling-off period (meaning a borrower must wait a certain amount
of time before entering into a new loan).77 If both of these elements are in place
and enforced, these commentators suggest that repetitive borrowing can
effectively be eliminated.
Another useful mechanism is to mandate transparency, requiring lenders to
make certain disclosures when issuing a payday loan.79 Although creating a
more informed consumer sounds like it could be quite beneficial, generally it has
led to rather marginal results in practice. The typical disclosure requirements
(such as the APR) arm borrowers with information they do not understand and
thus do not use effectively.80 In addition, human tendencies to believe that "it
won't happen to me" prevent borrowers from grasping the perils of failing to

71. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REv. 855, 897
(2007).
72. See id. at 897-98.
73. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.41(E) (LexisNexis 2006) (repealed 2008).
74. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 67-68.
75. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.10(1)(a) (West 2001).
76. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 66.
77. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 71, at 897-98.
78. See id.
79. See Francis,supra note 6, at 626-27.
80. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 71, at 903-04 (citing DEAN WILSON, CONSUMER LAW
CENTRE VICT. LTD., PAYDAY LENDING IN VICTORIA-A RESEARCH REPORT 77 (2002), available
at http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/CAV Credit Research/$file/pay
day.pdf; Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing: Why Re-regulating
the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1591-93
(2005)).
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quickly repay the loan. The key, therefore, is for states to require disclosures
that borrowers can actually understand.81 A potential way to accomplish this is
to force lenders to post the total finance charge in a tangible dollar amount rather
than as a more abstract APR.82
Finally, perhaps the most essential step that a state can take is to quickly and
effectively close any loopholes lenders may attempt to exploit. One author
likened payday lenders to the mythical Hydra, noting that each time a
governmental entity tries to remove one "head" of the predatory beast, the
industry simply sprouts another to replace it.83 For example, lenders may
circumvent many statutes that limit the maximum fee for a loan by using a
variety of exotic instruments, such as "sale leaseback" or "cash catalog"
transactions. 84 These arrangements basically accomplish the 8urpose of a
payday loan without falling under the exact statutory definition.
To combat
this, a governmental entity could choose either to prohibit transactions not
expressly allowed by law or to place a maximum rate on all short-term loans.
Legislatures can also draft decisive statutes that allow little room for creative
interpretation about their true meaning, or promulgate broad enabling acts that
allow agencies to issue regulations or opinions and address concerns as they
arise.
These examples are a few ways that federal and state governments, along
with their various regulatory agencies, can help level the playing field between
unsophisticated borrowers and powerful lenders. The multitude of available
mechanisms demonstrates that the industry is not "beyond repair" or
uncontrollable, but rather that a viable and beneficial market can exist if
appropriate efforts are made.
IV. THE HISTORY OF PAYDAY LENDING IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The initial legislation promulgated in South Carolina concerning the payday
lending industry was the 1998 South Carolina Deferred Presentment Services
Act (SCDPSA). 86 The SCDPSA's provisions were specifically tailored for
lenders who provided funds to borrowers in exchange for a postdated check87
essentially the classic payday loan. Noticeably, banks, other financial
institutions, and retail sellers not holding themselves out as a "deferred

81. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 71, at 904-05 (noting that consumers do understand
finance charges expressed in dollar amounts and suggesting a modification of disclosure
requirements to reflect this).
82. See id. at 905.
83. See Spector, supra note 10, at 962 & n.10 (citing EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY:
TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 164 (1969)).

84. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 18-21.
85.

See id.

86. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-110 to -260 (Supp. 1998).
87. See id. § 34-39-120(3).
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presentment service" were exempt.88 Despite the legislature's apparent intent to
combat the industry's problems forcefully, however, the initial provisions in the
Act were not as effective as intended. Its primary components were an annual
licensing requirement for all payday lenders and a disclosure requirement about
the fees charged by the lenders, including the APR. 90 Also, fees could not
exceed 15% of the loan amount, and the maximum time period for deferred
presentment loans was thirty-one days. 91 Lenders were further prohibited from
allowing borrowers to renew or rollover loans by immediately undertaking
another deferred presentment loan.92 If a borrower's check did not clear, the
lender could resort to mechanisms of civil recourse, including the imposition of a
returned check fee, but they could not seek criminal prosecution of the
borrower.9 3 Finally, deferred presentment lenders were prohibited from
engaging in other lending activities. 94
Despite what appeared to be an in-depth regulatory scheme, however, the
General Assembly seemingly felt that the SCDPSA was inadequate. The
legislature's displeasure with the law manifested itself in 2009 with amendments
to the Act. These amendments were designed to place tougher restrictions on
what one lawmaker characterized as "a rogue industry .

.

. that does not care

about the citizens of South Carolina." 9 5 The new statutes limit the dollar amount
of loans to $55096 and create a database to ensure that borrowers can only have
one loan outstanding at a time. 97 The purpose of this centralized database is to
provide comprehensive restrictions on the availability and amount of loans made
to borrowers who already have a loan in their name. 98 The Consumer Finance
Division of the Board of Financial Institutions oversees the new database, while
an independent authority operates it. 99 Under this current regime, if Betty
Borrower seeks to take out a payday loan, the lender must consult the database to
determine whether she has any outstanding loans before declaring her eligible,100
greatly reducing the possibility of her being caught in cycle of debt.
The amended SCDPSA also requires lenders to offer extended payment
plans for qualified borrowers. 101 If unable to repay a loan when due, a borrower
may elect once every twelve months to request an extended payment plan, under

88. § 34-39-140.
89. §§ 34-39-130, -150(D).
90. § 34-39-180(C), (D).
91. § 34-39-180(A), (E).
92. § 34-39-180(F).
93. § 34-39-180(G).
94. § 34-39-200(2).
95. See Roddie Burris, S.C. Senate Closes Payday Lending Loophole, THE STATE (Apr. 16,
2010), http://www.thestate.com/2010/04/16/1246068/sc-senate-closes-payday-lending.html.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(B) (Supp. 2010).
97. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-175(A), -270(A) (2010).
98. See id. § 34-39-175(B).
99. See id. § 34-39-175(A).
100. See id. § 34-39-175(B).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. §34-39-280 (Supp. 2010).
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which the borrower makes at least four "substantially equal" payments,
coinciding with the borrower's payday. 102 The amendments also prohibit lenders
from charging returned check fees for borrowers' checks that do not clear. 10 3
These provisions demonstrate an attempt by the General Assembly to further
curtail predatory practices and protect borrowers from exploitation.
Nonetheless, as the saying goes, "[t]he best-laid schemes o'mice and men
[often go awry],"104 and the 2009 amendments to the SCDPSA were no
exception. An unanticipated loophole allowed lenders to become licensed as
supervised lenders and be governed by another set of rules.105 In fact, 99 of the
245 companies who discontinued their payday lending licenses in 2009
requested to be reclassified as supervised lenders in order to avoid the tougher
restrictions.106 In response, lawmakers introduced yet another bill, which
modified the criteria of supervised loans. 10 7 The bill amends the definition of a
supervised loan to include a credit arrangement of at least 120 days. 108 In
addition, the bill provides that postdated checks can no longer secure supervised
loans. 109
If passed, the bill should close the loophole left after the 2009 modifications
and prevent lenders from continuing their traditional ayday lending businesses
under the more sheltered supervised lender moniker.
It is important to note,
however, that although this bill prevents supervised lenders from making payday
loans, it does not prevent payday lenders from dropping their licenses and
originating instruments that do not meet the definition of a supervised or payday
loan.
In contrast to the ongoing saga between lenders and the General Assembly,
the judiciary has had little interaction with the payday lending industry. The
most newsworthy development involving the courts concerned a recent
settlement between several lenders and a class of consumers who filed suit in
2007.11 Although the settlement still needs approval and finalization, the
defendant lenders have agreed to pay borrowers $2.5 million for various

102. See id. § 34-39-280(A), (C).
103. See id. § 34-39-180(G).
104. Robert Bums, To a Mouse (1785), reprintedin GEORGE SCOTT WILKIE, SELECT WORKS
OF ROBERT BURNS: VERSE, EXPLANATION AND GLOSSARY 3 (1999).

105. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-500 to -515 (2002) (Supp. 2010).
106. See Page Ivey, Payday Lenders Adjust to SC Law Change, THE STATE (Dec. 24, 2010),
http://www.thestate.com/2010/12/24/1618423/payday-lenders-adjust-to-sc-law.html#disqus thread.
107. S. 1065, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2010).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Burris, supra note 95 ("Lawmakers became alarmed when more than 100 payday
lenders changed their business licenses to become supervised lenders. Legislators feared the
lenders were trying to escape regulation while continuing to operate as payday lenders.").
111. See Order Preliminarily Approving Class Settlement at 1,In re Pay Day Lending & Title
Loan Litig., No. 07-CP-40-07710 (Richland, S.C., Ct. Common Pleas June 3, 2010), available at
http://www.scpaydayclaimsettlement.net/downloads/FiledOrder.pdf; Roddie Burris, $2.5 Million
Settlement Reached for PaydayLoans, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 13, 2010, at Al.
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transactions executed before the comprehensive legislation passed in 2009.112
While the lenders maintain they did not break any laws,113 their choice to settle
rather than litigate is notable.
V. STRENGTHENING THE SHARK TANK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOUTH
CAROLINA'S REGULATION OF THE PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY

The various mechanisms available to South Carolina demonstrate that
payday lending does not deserve an outright ban. In pursuing instead the
regulatory approach, the General Assembly may wish to give certain state
agencies greater control in overseeing the payday lending industry. An enabling
act that provides an agency, such as the State Board of Financial Institutions,
with greater discretion in promulgating rules, regulations, and advisory opinions
could eliminate loopholes and uncertainty about statutory definitions or proper
methods of compliance. The legislative process is inherently time-consuming,
and it is often difficult to build a consensus around even the most noble of
causes. With greater authority, a regulatory agency could shorten the lengthy
legislative process and quickly address unforeseen issues. The administrative
agencies directly overseeing the industry would presumably have deeper insights
into concerns about the industry, and the need for quick action makes them ideal
candidates for enhanced regulatory ability.
If increased agency discretion is not feasible, the legislature should consider
passing an act that uniformly regulates all short-term consumer loans. A
consistent statutory maximum rate or fee for all short-term loans could help
eliminate much of the gray area present in the fringe banking industry. This
would prevent lenders from crafting new instruments seeking to avoid oversight
because every consumer loan would be subject to these rules, no matter the
structure. Additionally, the burden would be placed on lenders to comply, rather
than on the state to take action post hoc.
VI. CONCLUSION

The future of the American payday lending industry remains highly
uncertain. Many of the developing trends and proposals may need national
oversight rather than the current patchwork of state regulations. In fact, some
recent commentators focusing on the industry conclude that a national, uniform
effort is the only adequate way to prevent exploitation of loopholes in the current
system.114 A national framework may be the only way to ensure complete

112. See Burris, supra note 111, at Al.
113. See id.
114. See Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out ofPayday Loans: Putting an End to
the Usurious and Unconscionable InterestRates Chargedby Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV.

1257, 1285 (2001) ("To stem this momentum [of the payday loan industry], and to prevent the
payday loan industry from becoming indelibly entrenched in American society, Congress needs to
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protection of all of the nation's consumers because some states are less strict in
their oversight of payday lenders than others. Despite this, states still have the
power to ensure that their legislation is clear, and that lenders comply with
specific rules.115 By enacting strong legislation, states can reduce the ability of
lenders to avoid oversight, and if nothing else, help prevent exploitation of their
citizens.
Therefore, notwithstanding the uncertain future of the industry, South
Carolina has enough options at its disposal to ensure that payday lending remains
available and fair to its citizens. Fringe banking businesses garner much
attention from the media and consumer advocates. However, without these
lenders, many borrowers may not have other legal options for short-term
financing. Strict regulation can ensure that a viable fringe banking industry
exists without the exploitation of borrowers. Legislative and regulatory scrutiny,
along with quick action when needed, will ensure that sufficient oversight occurs
and that lenders adhere to appropriate rules. Ultimately, a well-regulated,
accessible, and legal payday lending industry will best protect consumers both
from the neighborhood "loan shark" and from the shark in a nearby storefront.
Blake T. Williams

act quickly."); Johnson, supra note 1, at 147 ("[T]he federal government must act now to enact
comprehensive regulations dealing with the payday lending industry.").
115. See Spector, supra note 10, at 996.
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